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Abstract
Most modern block ciphers are built using components whose cryptographic strength is evaluated
in terms of their resistance to attacks on the whole cipher. In particular, differential properties of
vectorial Boolean functions are studied for the S-Boxes to thwart differential cryptanalysis. Little
is known on similar properties to avoid trapdoors in the design of the block cipher. In this paper
we present a form of trapdoors coming from alternative vector space structures, which we call
hidden sums, and give a characterization on the Boolean function S-Box to avoid any such hidden
sum. We also study some properties of this new class of vectorial Boolean functions, which we
call anti-crooked, and provide a toy cipher with a hidden sum trapdoor.
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1 Introduction
Most modern block ciphers are built using components whose cryptographic strength is evalu-
ated in terms of the resistance offered to attacks on the whole cipher. In particular, differential
properties of Boolean functions are studied for the S-Boxes to thwart differential cryptanalysis
([3, 21]).
Little is known on similar properties to avoid trapdoors in the design of the block cipher. In
[6] the authors investigate the minimal properties for the S-Boxes (and the mixing layer) of an
AES-like cipher (more precisely, a translation-based cipher, or tb cipher) to thwart the trapdoor
coming from the imprimitivity action, first noted in [23]. Later, in [7] the authors provide stronger
conditions on the S-Boxes of a tb cipher that avoid attacks coming from any group action. This
result has been generalized to tb ciphers over any field in [1].
In this paper we present a form of trapdoors coming from alternative vector space structure,
which we call hidden sums and study from a group action point of view in Section 2. In Section
3 we present a class of block cipher, which is a generalization of standard AES-like ciphers and
we are able to provide a characterization on the Boolean function S-Box to avoid any such hidden
sum, which can be dangerous cryptographic trapdoors. After having studied some properties of
this new class of vectorial Boolean functions in Section 4, which we call anti-crooked, in Section
5 we provide a toy cipher with a hidden-sum trapdoor and show that it can be thus broken with
attacks which are: much faster than brute force, independent of the number of rounds, independent
of the key-schedule.
∗riccardo.aragona@unitn.it, ∗∗marco.calderini@unitn.it, #maxsalacodes@gmail.com
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2 On hidden sums
Let p ≥ 2 be a prime and Fp be the finite field with p elements. Let V = (Fp)d . As observed by
Li [19], the symmetric group Sym(V ) will contain many isomorphic copies of the affine group
AGL(V ), which are its conjugates in Sym(V ). So there are several structures (V,◦) of an Fp-
vector space on the set V , where (V,◦) is the abelian additive group of the vector space. Each of
these structure will yield in general a different copy AGL(V,◦) of the affine group within Sym(V ).
Any AGL(V,◦) consists of the maps x 7→ g(x)◦ v, where g ∈ GL(V,◦), and v ∈V .
Assumption 1. Let G be a subgroup of Sym(V ).
• G is contained in the affine subgroup AGL(V,◦)
• G contains T , an abelian regular subgroup
For the rest of this section we consider the previous assumption and we call any ◦ a hidden
sum for G. Since T is regular, for each x ∈ V there exists unique σx ∈ T such that σx(0) = x,
therefore T = TV = {σy | y ∈ V}. Since T is abelian regular subgroup contained in G, we obtain
that T is an abelian regular subgroup of AGL(V,◦). By [5, 8] we can define simultaneously both
a structure of an associative, commutative, nilpotent ring (V,◦, ·) on V and an operation ✷ on V
such that (V,✷) is an abelian p-group. The two operations are linked by
x✷y = x◦ y◦ xy (1)
and T = TV is isomorphic to (V,✷), that is σy : x 7→ x✷y.
Lemma 2.1. For each u ∈V, the set uV is a subgroup of V with respect to both ◦ and ✷.
Proof. Since the distributive property between ◦ and · holds in (V,◦, ·), then we have uv1 ◦ uv2 =
u(v1 ◦ v2) for every v1,v2 ∈ V and so uV is ◦-subgroup of V . The set uV is also a ✷-subgroup of
V since
uv1✷uv2 = uv1 ◦ uv2 ◦ u
2v1v2 = u(v1 ◦ v2 ◦ uv1v2) ∈ uV.
Since T < AGL(V,◦), for y ∈V there is κy ∈ GL(V,◦) such that
σy(x) = x✷y = κy(x)◦ y (2)
for all x ∈V .
We denote by⊟t and ⊖t the opposite of t with respect to ✷ and ◦, respectively. By (2) we can
write
x = x⊟ y✷y = κy(x⊟ y)◦ y = κy(κ⊟y(x)◦ (⊟y))◦ y
for all x ∈V and so we obtain
κ⊟y = κ
−1
y . (3)
In fact the map (V,✷)→ T , y 7→ σy, is an isomorphism and we now show that the related map
(V,✷)→ GL(V,◦), y 7→ κy, is a group homomorphism.
Proposition 2.2. For every x,y ∈V
κx✷y = κyκx.
Therefore κV = {kx | x ∈V} is a p-group and so it acts unipotently on (V,◦).
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Proof. For every x,y,z ∈V , we have
(x✷y)✷z = (κy(x)◦ y)✷z = κz(κy(x))◦κz(y)◦ z
and also
x✷(y✷z) = x✷(κz(y)◦ z) = κκz(y)◦z(x)◦κz(y)◦ z,
so from associativity we obtain
κy✷ z = κκz(y)◦z = κzκy.
It follows that κV is a group, image of the homomorphism which sends y ∈V to κy ∈ κV , so κV is
a p-group and thus acts unipotently on (V,◦).
By the previous proposition and some well-known results on unipotent groups (see for instance
[15]), we note that there exists y ∈ V \ {0} such that κx(y) = y for each x ∈ V and so we can
consider U = {y ∈V | x✷y = x◦ y for all x ∈V} 6= {0}. We observe that U is a subgroup of both
the structures (V,◦) and (V,✷).
Let a∈V \{0}, we define the derivative of ρ with respect to a and✷ as Da(ρ ,✷) : x 7→ ρ(x✷a)⊟
ρ(x).
Definition 2.3. A permutation ρ ∈ Sym(V ) is called anti-crooked (AC) with respect to ✷ if for
each a ∈V \ {0} the set
Im(Da(ρ ,✷)) = {ρ(x✷a)⊟ρ(x) |x ∈V}
is not a ✷-coset of V . When we say that ρ is AC without specifying the sum, we mean that ρ is a
vectorial Boolean function which is AC with respect to the standard sum in (F2)d .
Remark 2.4. Compare the previous definition with the classical definition of crooked Boolean
function [18], that is, for each a ∈V \ {0} the set
Im(Da(ρ ,+)) = {ρ(x + a)+ρ(x) |x ∈V}
is a +-coset of V .
Let 1G ∈ G be the identity of G. We conclude this section with the main theorem linking the
AC property with the existence of hidden sums with respect to G.
Theorem 2.5. If there exists ρ ∈ G \ {1G} AC with respect to ✷, then G is not contained in any
copy of the affine group in Sym(V ).
Proof. By contradiction G is contained in an affine subgroup AGL(V,◦) of Sym(V ) and there is
an AC ρ ∈ G. So G satisfies Assumption 1 and our preliminary results hold. Since ρ is ◦-affine
and κy ∈ GL(V,◦), by (3) for a ∈U and x ∈V it follows that
ρ(x✷a)⊟ρ(x) = ρ(x)◦ρ(a)⊟ρ(x) = κ−1ρ(x)(ρ(x))◦κ
−1
ρ(x)(ρ(a))◦ (⊟ρ(x))
= κ−1ρ(x)(ρ(a))◦
(
ρ(x)⊟ρ(x)
)
= κ−1ρ(x)(ρ(a))
Let W = {κ−1ρ(x)(ρ(a)) |x ∈V} be the image of Da(ρ ,✷). Since κ−1x = κ⊟x for every x ∈V and ρ
is a permutation we have W = {κx(ρ(a)) |x ∈V}. For the sake of simplicity, we set ρ(a) = a¯. By
(1) and (2) we have κx(a¯) = a¯◦ xa¯ and
W = {κx(a¯) |x ∈V}= {a¯◦ a¯x |x ∈V}.
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Substituting x by κ−1y (x) in (2) we also obtain that x◦ y = κ−1y (x)✷y for every x,y ∈V , and so
a¯◦ a¯x = κ−1a¯ (a¯x)✷a¯.
We also have that κ−1a¯ (a¯x) = a¯x(⊟a¯)◦ a¯x = a¯(x(⊟a¯)◦x) lies in a¯V . Then W = a¯✷ a¯V . Hence, by
Lemma 2.1, Im(Da(ρ ,✷)) is a ✷-coset of V for any a ∈U , which contradicts the assumption that
ρ is AC with respect to ✷.
3 Regularity-based block ciphers over Fp
We introduce a block cipher defined over a finite field Fp, where the key action is not necessarily
defined via the usual translations on the message space V , rather it can be abelian regular group
acting on V . Indeed there are many block cipher where the keys act in a less traditional way (e.g.
GOST [16], SAFER [20], Kalyna [22]).
Let C = {ϕk | k ∈ K } be a block cipher for which the plaintext space V = (Fp)d , for some
d ∈N, coincides with the ciphertext space, where any encryption function ϕk ∈ Sym(V ) and K is
the key space. Suppose that any ϕk is the composition of l round functions, that is, permutations
ϕk,1, . . . ,ϕk,l , where each ϕk,h is determined by a session key k ∈K and the round index h. For
each h define the group generated by the h-round functions
Γh(C ) = 〈ϕk,h | k ∈K 〉 ≤ Sym(V ),
and the group generated by all Γh(C )’s
Γ∞(C ) = 〈Γh(C ) | h = 1, . . . , l〉= 〈ϕk,h | k ∈K ,h = 1, . . . , l〉
Clearly Γh(C )⊆ Γ∞(C ) for each h.
In the literature, “round” often refers either to the “round index” or to the “round function”.
We also assume that V is the Cartesian product
V =V1×·· ·×Vn (4)
where n > 1, and the Vi’s are subspaces of V with dimFp(Vi) = m > 1, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, so
d = mn.
Let T = T1 × . . .×Tn be an abelian subgroup of G = Γ∞(C ) such that Ti is abelian and acts
regularly on Vi. Thanks to the results in the previous section, we have Ti = TVi = {σi,v |v ∈Vi} and
there is an operation✷i on Vi such that (Vi,✷i) is an abelian group and Ti is isomorphic to (Vi,✷i).
So we can define the regular action of T on V as the following parallel action
σv(w) = w✷v = (w1✷1 v1, . . . ,wn✷n vn)
where v = (v1, . . . ,vn) and w = (w1, . . . ,wn) with vi,wi ∈Vi.
Definition 3.1. An element γ ∈ Sym(V ) is called a bricklayer transformation with respect to (4)
if γ acts on an element v = (v1, · · · ,vn), with vi ∈Vi, as
γ(v) = (γ1(v1), · · · ,γn(vn)),
for some γi ∈ Sym(Vi). Each γi is called a brick.
Clearly any γ ∈ T is a bricklayer transformation. Now we generalise the definition of transla-
tion based cipher C over Fp (Definition 3.3 in [1]) to include more general key actions.
Definition 3.2. A block cipher C = {ϕk | k ∈K } over Fp is called regularity based (rb) if each
encryption function ϕk is the composition of l round functions ϕk,h, for k ∈ K , and h = 1, . . . , l,
where in turn each round function ϕk,h can be written as a composition σφ(k,h)λhγh of three per-
mutations acting on V , that is,
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• γh is a bricklayer transformation not depending on k and γh(0) = 0,
• λh is a group automorphism of (V,✷) not depending on k,
• φ : K ×{1, . . . , l} → V is the key scheduling function, so that φ(k,h) is the h-round key,
given the session key k;
• for at least one round index h0 we have that the map K → V given by k 7→ φ(k,h0) is
surjective, that is, every element of V occurs as an h0-round key.
Remark 3.3. A translation based cipher is a particular case of an rb cipher when T = (T,+) is
the usual translation group. Note however that we drop the assumption on the properness of the
mixing layer, since it has to be considered only when dealing with a primitive action.
We now work in the group Γh(C ), for a fixed h, omitting for simplicity the indices h for the
various functions. Write ρ = λ γ . Since for h0 the map K →V given by k 7→ φ(k,h0) is surjective,
note that
Γh0(C ) = 〈ρ ,T 〉. (5)
We are ready to prove the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.4. If C is an rb cipher and γi is AC with respect to ✷i for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, then
Γh0(C ) and Γ∞(C ) are not contained in any copy of the affine group of Sym(V ).
Proof. By contradiction G = Γh0(C ) is contained in a copy AGL(V,◦) of the affine group of
Sym(V ). By (5) we are under Assumption 1 and by the proof of Theorem 2.5 we obtain that if
a 6= 0 and a ∈U 6= {0}, with
U = {y ∈V | x✷y = x◦ y for all x ∈V},
then Im(Da(ρ ,✷)) is a ✷-coset of V .
Since λ is an automorphism of (V,✷), applying λ−1 to Im(Da(ρ ,✷)), by definition of ✷ and
γ we obtain
{γ(x✷a)⊟ γ(x) |x ∈V}= c✷bV = (c1✷b1V1)× . . .× (cn✷bnVn)
for some b = (b1, . . . ,bn) and c = (c1, . . . ,cn) in V .
Choosing one non-zero a ∈U , then there is a non-zero component ai ∈ Vi of a, and we have that
the projection
{γi(xi✷ai)⊟ γi(xi) |xi ∈Vi}
is a ✷i-coset of Vi. So we obtain a contradiction since γi is AC.
4 On anti crooked functions
In this section we consider the interesting case p = 2, and we give some properties on the anti-
crookedness of a Boolean function with respect to the usual structure (V,+).
Let F = F2. Let m ≥ 1, any vectorial Boolean function (vBf) f from Fm to Fm can be ex-
pressed uniquely as a univariate polynomial in F2m [x]. When f is also invertible we call it a vBf
permutation. We denote the derivative Da f = Da( f ,+)
Definition 4.1. Let m,n ≥ 1. Let f be a vBf from Fm to Fn, for any a ∈ Fm and b ∈ Fn we define
δ f (a,b) = |{x ∈ Fm |Da f (x) = b}|.
The differential uniformity of f is
δ ( f ) = max
a∈Fm b∈Fna 6=0
δ f (a,b).
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f is said δ -differential uniform if δ = δ ( f ).
Those functions such that δ ( f ) = 2 are said almost perfect nonlinear (APN).
We restrict from now on to the case m = n, any times we write that f is a vBf, we will implicit
mean f : Fm → Fm.
We recall the following definition presented recently in [6].
Definition 4.2. Let f be a vBf. f is weakly-APN if
|Im(Da f )|> 2
m−1
2
, ∀a ∈ Fm \ {0}.
The notion of weakly-APN function was introduced as a necessary condition to avoid a subtle
trapdoor coming from imprimitive actions (see [6]).
A direct check shows that an APN function is a weakly-APN. However, functions that are
weakly-APN but not APN are of interest as shown in the following.
Theorem 4.3. Let f be a vBf on F2m that is weakly-APN but not APN. Then, there exists a ∈ F2m
nonzero such that Im(Da f ) is not a coset of a subspace W ⊆ F2m .
Proof. By contradiction suppose that for all a 6= 0 we have Im(Da f ) = w+W for some w ∈ F2m
and W vector space. Since f is weakly-APN, |Im(Da f )| is strictly larger than 2m−2, thus |W | ≥
2m−1 and dimF(W ) = m− 1. But then Da f is a 2-to-1 function for all a 6= 0, which means that f
is APN, and this contradicts our hypothesis. In other words, there exists a such that Im(Da f ) is
not a coset.
Consider the following lemma for a power function (not necessarily a permutation).
Lemma 4.4. Let us consider F2m as a vector space over F. Let f (x) = xd . If there exists a ∈ F2m ,
a 6= 0, such that Im(Da f ) is a coset of a subspace of F2m , then Im(Da′ f ) is a coset of subspace of
F2m for all a′ 6= 0.
Proof. We have Im(Da f ) = w+W where W is a F-vector subspace of F2m for some w ∈ F2m .
Now, let a′ ∈ F2m , a′ 6= 0, we have
Da′ f (x) = (x+ a′)d + xd =
(
a′
a
)d [(
x
a
a′
+ a
)d
+
(
x
a
a′
)d]
=
(
a′
a
)d
Da f
(
x
a
a′
)
.
So we have Im(Da′ f ) =
(
a′
a
)d
Im(Da f ) =
(
a′
a
)d
w+
(
a′
a
)d
W = w′+W ′. Since W ′ = (a′/a)dW
is again an F-vector subspace of F2m , our claim is proved.
Thanks to Lemma 4.4, for power functions we can strengthen Theorem 4.3.
Corollary 4.5. Let f be a vBf permutation on F2m that is weakly-APN but not APN. If f (x) = xd ,
then f is AC.
Remark 4.6. Given an arbitrary vBf there are three possible cases: f is either crooked or anti-
crooked or neither. However, Lemma 4.4 shows that for a power function there are only two
possible cases: f is either crooked or anti-crooked.
We want now to investigate condition that guaranty the anti-crookedness of a Boolean func-
tion.
A vBf can also be represented by m Boolean functions of m variables, the combinations of
those functions are called components. We denote by < f ,v > the combination corresponding to
v. We recall the following non-linearity measure, as introduced in [12]:
6
nˆ( f ) := max
a∈Fm\{0}
|{v ∈ Fm \ {0} : deg(< Da f ,v >) = 0}|.
For all a ∈ Fm \ {0}, let Va be the vector space
Va = {v ∈ Fm \ {0} : deg(< Da f ,v >) = 0}∪{0}.
By definition, if t = maxa∈Fm\{0}dim(Va), then nˆ( f ) = 2t − 1.
Proposition 4.7. Let f be a vBf and a ∈ Fm \{0}. Then f (a)+V⊥a is the smallest affine subspace
of Fm containing Im(Da f ). In particular, nˆ( f ) = 0 if and only if for any a ∈ Fm \ {0} there is no
proper affine subspace of Fm containing Im(Da f ).
Proof. Let a ∈ Fm \ {0}. Note that Va = {v ∈ Fm :< Da f ,v > is constant}. Let x ∈ Fm, then
Da f (x) = f (a) +w, for some w ∈ Fm, and < Da f (x),v >= c ∈ F for all v ∈ Va. In particular
c =< Da f (0),v >=< f (a),v > and so < w,v >= 0, that is, w ∈ V⊥a . Then we have Im(Da f ) ⊆
f (a)+V⊥a . Now, let A be an affine subspace containing Im(Da f ), then A = f (a)+V , for some
vector subspace V in Fm. For all v ∈ V⊥, we have < Da f ,v >=< f (a),v >= c ∈ F and so, by
definition, V⊥ ⊆Va. Then A contains f (a)+V⊥a .
Finally, nˆ( f ) = 0 if and only if Va = {0} for all a ∈ Fm \ {0}, and so our claim follows.
Obviously, for any affine subspace W , Im(Da f ) 6⊂W =⇒ Im(Da f ) 6=W and so we have the
next corollary.
Corollary 4.8. Let f be a vBf. If nˆ( f ) = 0 then f is AC.
Coming back to power functions it is important to recall a result by Kyureghyan.
Theorem 4.9 ([18]). The only crooked APN power functions in F2n are those with exponent 2i +
2 j, gcd(i− j,n) = 1.
Recalling that the known exponents of APN power functions (up to factor 2i) are
2k + 1, gcd(k,m) = 1 (Gold’s exponent [2, 13])
22k− 2k + 1, gcd(k,m) = 1 (Kasami’s exponent [17])
24k + 23k + 22k + 2k− 1, m = 5k (Dobbertin’s functions [11])
if m = 2l+ 1 also
2l + 3 (Welch’s exponent [9, 4, 14])
2l + 2
l
2 − 1 if l is even and
2l + 2
3l+1
2 − 1 if l is odd (Niho’s exponent [10, 14])
2m− 2 (patched inversion [21])
This implies that the only crooked power functions, among the known maps, are those with Gold’s
exponent. Thanks to Remark 4.6 we have:
Corollary 4.10. Let xd be one of the APN power functions above, with d not a Gold’s exponent,
then xd is AC. In particular the power function x2m−2 is AC for all m≥ 3.
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 4.4 and the theorem above. For the case of the patched
inversion, from Corollary 4.5, it is AC also in even dimension.
Having examined some anti-crooked functions we would like to show some properties of this
notion.
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Lemma 4.11. If f is AC then f−1 is not necessarily AC.
Proof. We provide an explicit example f : F6 → F6 defined by f (x) = x49, then f−1(x) = x5. A
computer check shows that f is anti-crooked while f−1 is not. In particular, Im(De6( f−1)) is an
affine subspace of dimension 4, where e is a primitive element of F64 such that e6 = e4 + e3 + e+
1.
We recall that two vBf’s f and f ′ are called CCZ-equivalent if their graphs G f = {(x, f (x)) |
x∈ Fn} and G f ′ = {(x, f ′(x)) | x∈ Fn} are affine equivalent. We recall also that f and f ′ are called
EA-equivalent if there exist three affine functions g, g′ and g′′ such that f ′ = g′ ◦ f ◦ g+ g′′.
Lemma 4.11 and the well-known fact that a vBf f is CCZ-equivalent to f−1 imply the following
result.
Corollary 4.12. The anti-crookedness is not CCZ invariant.
On the other hand, surprisingly anti-crookedness behaves well with EA invariance, as shown
below.
Proposition 4.13. The anti-crookedness is EA invariant.
Proof. Let f be a vBf anti-crooked, and let g be a vBf such that f and g are EA equivalent. Then,
there exist three affinities λ1,λ2,λ3 such that g = λ1 f λ2 +λ3. Without loss of generality we can
suppose f (0) = g(0) = 0 and λi(0) = 0 for all i = 1,2,3. Then
Dag = λ1 f λ2(x+ a)+λ1 f λ2(x)+λ3(x+ a)+λ3(x)
= λ1( f (λ2(x)+λ2(a))+ f (λ2(x))+λ−11 λ3(a)),
which implies
Im(Dag) = λ1(λ−11 λ3(a)Im(Da f )),
thus g is AC if and only if f is AC.
5 A block cipher with a hidden sum
In this section we give an example, in a small dimension, of a translation based block cipher
in which it is possible to embed a hidden-sum trapdoor. The underlying field is binary and all
involved functions are vBf’s.
Let m = 3, n = 2, then d = 6 and we have the message space V = (F2)6. The mixing layer of
our toy cipher is given by the matrix
λ =


0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0


Note that λ is a proper mixing layer (see Definition 3.2 [1]). The bricklayer transformation γ =
(γ1,γ2) of our toy cipher is given by two identical S-boxes
γ1 = γ2 = α5x6 +αx5 +α2x4 +α5x3 +αx2 +αx
where α is a primitive element of F23 such that α3 = α + 1.
The S-box γ1 is 4-differential uniform but it is not anti-crooked, since Im(Dα2γ1) is an affine
subspace (of dimension 1).
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We show now the existence of a hidden-sum trapdoor for our toy cipher. We consider the hid-
den sum ◦ over V1 =V2 = (F2)3 induced by the elementary abelian regular group T◦ = 〈τ1,τ2,τ3〉,
where
τ1(x) = x ·

 1 0 00 1 0
0 1 1

+e1, τ2(x) = x ·

 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

+e2, τ3(x) = x ·

 1 1 00 1 0
0 0 1

+e3, (6)
with e1 = (1,0,0), e2 = (0,1,0) and e3 = (0,0,1). In other words, τi(x) = x◦ ei for any 1≤ i≤ 3.
Obviously T =T◦×T◦ is an elementary abelian group inducing the hidden sum (x1,x2)◦′ (y1,y2) =
(x1 ◦ y1,x2 ◦ y2) on V =V1×V2. We denote
e′1 = (1,0,0,0,0,0), . . . ,e′6 = (0,0,0,0,0,1) and we claim the following.
Theorem 5.1. 〈T+,λ γ〉 ⊆ AGL(V,◦′), where T+ is the translation group with respect to +.
Proof. By a computer check it results that σe′i ∈AGL(V,◦′) for all 1≤ i≤ 6 where σe′i(x) = x+e′i.
Since these generate T+, this implies T+ ⊆ AGL(V,◦′).
By another computer check the map λ γ lies in AGL(V,◦′)
Thanks to the previous theorem, ◦′ is a hidden sum for our toy cipher, but it remains to verify
whether it is possible to use it to attack the toy cipher with an attack that costs less than brute force.
We have not discussed the key schedule and the number of rounds yet. We have in mind a cipher
where the number of rounds is so large to make any classical attack useless (such as differential
cryptanalysis) and the key scheduling offer no weakness. Therefore, the hidden sum will actually
be essential to break the cipher only if the attack that we build will cost significantly less than 64
encryptions, considering that the key space is (F2)6.
Remark 5.2. Given a sum ✷, the vectors e1,e2,e3 may not be a linear basis of (V1,✷). For
this specific sum ◦, the vectors e1,e2,e3 actually form a basis for (V1,◦) as can be checked by
computer. Let x = (x1,x2,x3) ∈V1, from (6) we can simply write
τ1(x) = (x1 + 1,x2 + x3,x3),τ2(x) = (x1,x2 + 1,x3),τ3(x) = (x1,x1 + x2,x3 + 1).
Let us write x as a linear combination of e1, e2 and e3 w.r.t. to the sum ◦, i.e. x= λ1e1◦λ2e2◦λ3e3.
We claim that λ1 = x1, λ3 = x3 and λ2 = λ1λ3+x2. To show that, we adopt the following notation:
if b ∈ F2, we can write τbv (x) denoting either τv(x) (when b = 1) or x (when b = 0). Then
x = (λ1e1 ◦λ2e2)◦λ3e3 = τλ33 (λ1e1 ◦λ2e2) = τ
λ3
3 (τ
λ2
2 (λ1e1)) = τ
λ2
2 (τ
λ3
3 (λ1e1))
= τλ22 (τ
λ3
3 ((λ1,0,0))) = τ
λ2
2 ((λ1,λ3λ1,λ3)) = (λ1,λ1λ3 +λ2,λ3).
So
(x1,x2,x3) = x = (λ1,λ1λ3 +λ2,λ3)
and our claim is proved.
Thanks to the previous remark we can find the coefficients of a vector v′ = (v,u) ∈ V with
respect to ◦′ by using the following algorithm separately on the two bricks of w.
Algorithm 1.
Input: vector x ∈ F32
Output: coefficients λ1, λ2 and λ3.
[1] λ1 ← x1;
[2] λ3 ← x3;
[3] λ2 ← λ1λ3 + x2;
return λ1,λ2,λ3.
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Let v′ = (v,u) ∈V , we write
v = λ v1 e1 ◦λ v2 e2 ◦λ v3 e3 and u = λ u1 e1 ◦λ u2 e2 ◦λ u3 e3.
We denote by
[v′] = [λ v1 ,λ v2 ,λ v3 ,λ u1 ,λ u2 ,λ u3 ]
the vector with the coefficients obtained from the bricks of v using Algorithm 1.
Let ϕ = ϕk be the encryption function, with a given unknown session key k. We want to mount
two attacks by computing the matrix M and the translation vector t defining ϕ ∈AGL(V,◦′), which
exist thanks to Theorem 5.1.
Assume we can call the encryption oracle. Then M can be computed from the 7 ciphertexts
ϕ(0),ϕ(e′1), . . . ,ϕ(e′6), since the translation vector is [t] = [ϕ(0)] and the [ϕ(e′i)]+ [t]’s represent
the matrix rows. In other words, we will have
[ϕ(v′)] = [v′] ·M+[t], [ϕ−1(v′)] = ([v′]+ [t]) ·M−1,
for all v′ ∈V , where the product row by column is the standard scalar product. The knowledge of
M and M−1 provides a global deduction (reconstruction), since it becomes trivial to encrypt and
decrypt. However, we have an alternative depending on how we compute ϕ−1:
• if we compute M−1 from M, by applying for example Gaussian reduction, we will need only
our 7 initial encryptions;
• else we can compute M−1 from the action of φ−1, assuming we can call the decryption
oracle, simply by performing the 7 decryptions ϕ−1(e′i) and ϕ−1(0); indeed, the rows of
M−1 will obviously be [ϕ−1(e′i)]+ [ϕ−1(0)].
The first attack requires more binary operations, since we need a matrix inversion, but only 7 en-
cryptions. The second attack requires both 7 encryptions and 7 decryptions, but less binary oper-
ations. The first attack is a chosen-plaintext attack, while the second is a chosen-plaintext/chosen-
ciphertext attack. Both obtain the same goal, that is, the complete reconstruction of the encryption
and decryption functions. Note that, since an encryption/decryption will cost a huge number of
binary operations in our assumptions (we are supposing that many rounds are present), the first
attack is more dangerous and its cost is approximately that of 7 encryptions, while the cost of the
second attack is approximately 14 encryptions (being the cost of an encryption close to the cost of
a decryption).
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